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Abstract—Most of today’s MAC implementations can be
turned into permissive mode, where no enforcement is performed
but alerts are raised instead. This behavior is very close to
an anomaly IDS except that the system is configured through
a MAC policy. MAC implementations such as SELinux and
AppArmor come with a default policy including real life and
practical rules ready to be used as is or as a basis for a custom
policy. In this paper, we first propose an extension of an IDS
based on information flow control. We address issues concerning
programs execution and improve its expressiveness in terms of
security policy. This extended model can be configured to reach
a wide variety of different security goals. Particularly, it allows
for information flow checking based on users and/or programs
dependent policy rules. Furthermore, suspicious modification of
binary programs can be detected to avoid malware execution.
We also propose an algorithm for deriving an AppArmor MAC
policy into an information flow policy, and thus get the advantage
of having a ready to use policy offering good security. We finally
show a practical example of deriving such a policy in order to
configure our IDS.
Index Terms—Intrusion detection, Information flow control,
Mandatory Access Control
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past years, access control mechanisms in most
operating systems have been improved. While traditional
discretionary access control (DAC) remains widely used,
previous research works on mandatory access control (MAC)
have led to implementations in common operating systems,
such as Linux, FreeBSD, MacOSX and Windows. Examples
include SELinux [11], AppArmor [1], Smack [10], Tomoyo
[5]. By using those mechanisms, one can finely control the
operations each subject is allowed to perform on the objects
of the system. A significant amount of work has been spent on
defining default security policies for SELinux and Apparmor,
offering rules for a lot of applications. This makes those tools
valuable for system administrators, reducing the work needed
to set up complex security policies in real life systems.
In the same spirit, several models of information flow
control have been proposed to address one persistent weakness
of access control models, namely the possibility for users or
programs to indirectly and illegally access to pieces of infor-
mation by collaborating with users who have legal access to it.
In this article, we focus on intrusion detection and propose a
model of information flow control based on mandatory access
control. We perform information flow tracking and consider
that the detection of an illegal information flow is an intrusion
symptom. As we do not enforce the security policy, an alert is
raised in case of intrusion and illegal flows are not forbidden.
This behavior is known as permissive mode and is available
with most MAC implementations. Our model is inspired from
a previous model presented in [12], with three new major
contributions. First, our extended model supervises programs
execution. Then, policy expressiveness has been improved by
using a generic tag system. It is now possible to specify an
information flow policy based either on user rights, programs
rights, or both at the same time. Finally, in order to determine a
practical security policy for this model, we define an algorithm
to derive an information flow policy from an AppArmor MAC
policy. The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly
present previous works in the literature, related to MAC and
information flow tracking. A formal model for representing
information flows is then introduced, and our extended model
is presented. Finally, we show how it is possible to derive
information flow control from a MAC policy.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In the following, files, sockets and other resources are
referred to as objects while processes are referred to as
subjects. Any subject or object containing information is a
container of information. Discretionary access control (DAC)
is the most commonly used access control mechanism and is
the default on UNIX based systems. Access is restricted given
the identity and the group of the subject who tries to access
to an object. It is said to be discretionary because subjects are
allowed to transfer certain permissions to each other at their
own discretion. Each subject and object has a set of security
attributes, and any operation requires to test that it is conform
to the policy. Mandatory access control, at the opposite of
discretionary access control, is based on authorization rules
(policy) enforced by the operating system. The policy is cen-
trally controlled by a security policy administrator, and users
cannot modify it. Regular users cannot declassify information,
and it is then possible to verify the policy consistency against
a given set of security goals [3], [7]. Therefore, a number of
security mechanisms are based on MAC, and MAC is central
to our approach. This aspect will be further detailed later in
section V-B.
Advances in common operating systems such as Linux and
FreeBSD include the introduction of generic access control
frameworks, including LSM [14] (Linux Security Modules)
and TrustedBSD [13]. LSM has led to several implementa-
tions, among which SELinux [11], Tomoyo [5], Smack [10]
and AppArmor [1] are the most commonly used. When used
in enforcement mode, they block illegal accesses to resources
before those can be conducted. When used in permissive mode,
their behavior is comparable to a model-based IDS.
SELinux [11] is the first security module available in
Linux, and it has been designed to implement a flexible
MAC mechanism called type enforcement (TE). With type
enforcement, all subjects and objects have a type identifier.
When accessing an object, a subject must have an authorized
type of operation (read, write, etc. . . ) with respect to the
object’s type, and regardless of its user identity. AppArmor
[1] is a simple MAC implementations available in the Linux
kernel as an alternative to SELinux. AppArmor aims at being
easier to use and configure than SELinux. It is used by default
by Novell in their products and comes with a predefined policy,
and a set of generic definitions to ease the creation of new
policies. AppArmor will be further detailed later in this paper
in section V-B.
Contrary to DAC or MAC systems which ensure security
in controlling access to containers of information, information
flow control ensures security in preventing illegal information
flows. Models of information flow control have been intro-
duced in the eighties by Denning, Biba, Bell and Lapadula
[4], [2], [9]. These models are the origin of the Multilevel
Security (MLS) model. In this model, subjects and objects are
labeled with a security level, which represent their sensitivity
or clearance. Any information flow from lower-level containers
to higher-level containers is illegal. Implementations of MLS
models try to precisely observe data manipulations in order
to prevent illegal information flows. Flume [8], and Histar
[15] are modern implementations of information flow control.
Flume is an implementation of distributed information flow
control (DIFC) for Linux, acting at the OS level, and using
standard OS abstractions (processes, pipes, . . . ). In Flume,
processes are confined according to a flow control policy.
Histar is an operating system aiming at minimizing the amount
of code that must be trusted. It provides a secure operating
system using mostly untrusted user-level libraries (the only
fully trusted code being the kernel). It uses Asbestos labels on
six OS level object types (threads, address spaces, segments,
gates, containers and devices).
Blare [17], [12] is a policy-based intrusion detection system
aiming at providing fine grained information flow tracking.
Content and containers are distinguished, and information
flows are observed using tainting techniques. Contents are
the data and containers are physical or logical data storage.
Tags are associated to containers, independently describing
the content as well as the policy for each container in the
system. The information flow policy can either be automat-
ically constructed from a DAC policy or adjusted by an
administrator. This model has been implemented in Blare1
and has proved to be helpful to detect attacks (see [6]).
Nonetheless the model proposed in [12] is not aware of
execution of programs and processes behavior, and does not
1Blare is freely available at http://www.rennes.supelec.fr/blare/
take different users into account, which is necessary to ensure
a fine observation of information flows. Consequently, in this
model and its implementation, the authors were not able to
derive a Blare policy from a MAC policy, and illegal flows
between processes were ignored. In this article we propose to
address this problem and we present in section III an extension
of the model introduced in [12]. We also explain how we can
now derive an information flow policy from a MAC policy.
As an example, we give a general algorithm to derive a Blare
policy from an Apparmor policy.
III. EXTENDED BLARE MODEL
In our extended model, we introduce three kinds of contain-
ers : “on-disk” containers such as files are called persistent
containers (i.e. long-term storage), “in memory” containers
are called volatile containers (memory pages, shared memory,
IPC. . . ). Processes are considered as a third kind of containers
(even though these are volatile) as they correspond to active
subjects as opposed to passive memory. We note C the set of
all containers, PC the set of all persistent containers, VC the
set of all volatile containers and P the set of all processes.
Hence, C = PC ∪ VC ∪ P . As multiple processes can in fact
execute the same program (e.g. multiple forks of the apache
daemon), we also define Π, the set of all classes of processes.
Two processes running the same program are in the same
class. In the same manner, we distinguish code of running
programs from other passive data. We attach meta-information
to each element of information in the system that we want to
supervise. We note I the set of all meta-information attached
to data (e.g. all the personal data of a user, or the code of
the apache daemon stored “on disk” in /usr/bin/apache), and
X the set of all meta-information attached to running code
(as the “in memory” code of the apache process). In practice,
elements of I and elements of X are integers. Finally we also
model users and we note U the set of all users.
The information flow policy is divided into three inde-
pendent parts. The first part (PPC) defines the authorized
combinations of atomic information for the set of persistent
containers that we want to supervise, the second part (PU )
defines the allowed combinations of atomic information for
the users of the system, and the third part (PΠ) defines the
authorized combinations of atomic information for the set of
all the classes of processes (each class being attached to the
code of a program).
Definition 1 (Information flow policy): An information
flow policy is a triplet P = (PPC ,PU ,PΠ) where
2
PPC ⊆ PC × ℘(I ∪ X ), PU ⊆ ℘(I ∪ X ) × U and
PΠ ⊆ Π× ℘(I ∪ X ).
• A pair (c, a) ∈ PC expresses that the container c is
allowed to contain any subset of a
• A pair (u, a) ∈ PU expresses that any subset of a can be
read or executed by the user u.
• A pair (pi, a) ∈ PΠ expresses that any subset of a can be
read or executed by a class of processes pi running the
2
℘ (A) denotes all the subset of a set A
same code.
Then, we introduce the three following notations PPC(c),
PU (u) and PΠ(pi) whose respective values are {a ∈ ℘(I ∪
X )|(c, a) ∈ PPC}, {a ∈ ℘(I ∪ X )|(u, a) ∈ PU}, {a ∈
℘(I ∪ X )|(pi, a) ∈ PΠ}.
Thus, the definition of the information flow policy is defined
for persistent containers, for users, and for classes of processes
through sets of rules accurately stating which combinations of
atomic information those can receive, and which information
are authorized to mix together.
These rules are stored in a distributed fashion : we attach
three tags to each container : an information tag, a policy
tag and an execute policy tag. Dynamic detection of illegal
information flows can then be performed at the container level.
The information tag of a container c ∈ C is a set of elements
of I ∪ X describing the content of c (i.e. which elements of
information it contains). It is updated everytime an information
flow modifies the content of c. Note that because we cannot
monitor all the information flows at the OS level without
hardware memory tagging [16], the information tag contains
an over-approximation of the actual content.
The policy tag of a container c ∈ C is a set of subsets of
I ∪X . It defines all the possible combinations of information
that are allowed to flow towards the container. This tag is
updated when a modification of the policy affects the container
c (in practice, we do not change the policy at runtime).
The execute policy tag of a container c ∈ C is a set of
subsets of I ∪ X . It defines all the possible combinations of
information that processes running the content of c as code are
allowed to read or execute. Thus, it is attached to the code of
programs, and as the information tag, it is updated everytime
an information flow modifies the content of c (i.e. changing the
code of a program changes the policy for running it). Note that
it is independent of users rights, those are taken into account
at execution time (see IV-2).
IV. INFORMATION FLOW TRACKING IN A LIVE SYSTEM
We denote 0, 1, 2, ..., n, ... the states of the system and
we note ti the transition between the states i and i + 1 .
These transitions correspond to operations requiring an update
of the tags content (fork, execution, creation of objects and
information flows).
In the following, we will use the functions itag, ptag and
xptag that respectively associate an information tag, a policy
tag and an execute policy tag to a container.
• itag : C 7→ ℘(I ∪ X ), itagi(c) is the information tag
attached to the container c at state i
• ptag : C 7→ ℘(℘(I ∪ X )), ptagi(c) is the policy tag
attached to the container c at state i
• xptag : PC 7→ ℘(℘(I ∪ X )), xptagi(c) is the execute
policy tag attached to the container c at state i
The relation ⊓ is defined on the sets of sets as follows :
A⊓B = {a∩b|a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. We also introduce the notations
⊤ and ⊥ which are respectively the set of all sets of tags and
the set containing the empty set.
An information flow towards a container c is legal if and
only if the new content of c (characterized by itags(c)) is
authorized into c, i.e. it appears in ptags(c).
Definition 2 (Legality of an information flow): An
information flow towards a container c happening during
the transition ti is legal iff ∃p ∈ ptag(c)i+1 such that
itag(c)i+1 ⊆ p. We note itag(c)i+1 4 ptag(c)i+1 when this
condition is verified.
In the following subsections, we are going to detail accu-
rately the propagation of the tags for each operation.
1) fork: When a process p forks, a clone q is created. We
also clone all of its tags.
2) execution of a program: recall that we consider passive
data and running code differently. A data is considered as
running code once it is executed by a process through an
exec() system call. We note Run : I → X , where Run(d)
characterizes the running code out of the execution of a data
d at transition ti. After an exec() call, the three tags of the
calling process p running the object o on behalf of u are
initialized as follows. Its information tag becomes :
itag(p)i+1 :=
⋃
k∈itag(o)i\X
{Run(k)}
Note that elements of X from o are discarded, because
these meta-information are only used to compute the legality
of write and append operations (see IV-6).
Its execute policy tag is initialized to the execute policy tag
of o.
xptag(p)i+1 := xptagi(o)
Its policy tag is computed from its execute policy tag
and from the legal combinations of information for the user
running it :
ptag(p)i+1 = xptagi(o) ⊓ PU (u)}
3) Persistent object creation: When a process p creates a
new persistent object o on behalf of u, the new object receives
an empty information tag.
itag(o)i+1 = ∅
We associate a policy tag to the new object as follows.
The authorized flows towards the created object are the flows
composed of atomic informations that are legal for u (i.e. the
policy states that u is allowed to access this information).
ptag(o)i+1 = PU (u)}
An execute policy tag is also attached to the new object,
and it is set to ⊤ by default : there is no restrictions on code
execution as it contains no (executable) information.
xptag(o)i+1 = ⊤
4) Volatile object creation: When a new volatile object is
created, it is assigned an empty information tag as it contains
no information yet. It is then updated appropriately when
further information flows occur (as it will be detailed in the
following).
itag(o)i+1 = ∅
In the same manner, the execute policy tag is initialized to ⊤.
xptag(o)i+1 = ⊤
In this model, we consider that anything is allowed to
flow into volatile containers. The legality of information flows
involving volatile containers depend on the processes operating
on it, i.e. processes can only access to information that matches
their policy tag. Thus, the policy tag of volatile containers is
initialized to ⊤ so that anything can flow into it.
ptag(o)i+1 = ⊤
Using these tags, we are able to perform dynamic detection
of illegal information flows by checking if itag(c) 4 ptag(c)
stands everytime a flow occurs.
We classify information flows as read like, write like and
append like. When a process p reads from an object o, there
is a read like information flow between the containers o and
p. In the same way, when a process p replaces the content of
an object o, there is a write like information flow. Finally,
if the process writes without erasing the existing content
of the object, it is an append like information flow. When
an information flow occurs, we make an over-approximation
of the actual flow, considering all the data that might have
flown (i.e. all the information tag from the source). It behaves
differently whether a read like, write like or append like
information flow happends, and tags are updated accordingly
for the process and the object.
5) read like operations: When a read like flow occurs
on an object o by a process p, we update the information tag
and the execute policy tag of p. Note that, as in the case of the
execution of a program, elements of X from the information
tag of o are discarded (process execution history is not saved
in our model).
itag(p)i+1 := itag(p)i ∪ (itag(o)i \ X )
xptag(p)i+1 := xptag(p)i ⊓ (xptag(o)i)
6) write like operations: If the process p overwrites the
content of the object o, we simply replace the information tag
and the execute policy tag of the object by those of the process.
Note that the elements of X in the information tag are used
to check the legality of this write like operation performed by
this particular code being executed by p.
itag(o)i+1 := itag(p)i
xptag(o)i+1 := xptag(p)i
7) append like operations: A process p can also append
pieces of information to an object o. In this case, the new
information tag of o is the concatenation of both information
tags. As for write like operations, the elements of X are used
to check the legality of the operation. The execute policy tag
is updated so as to match both the execute policy tags of the
process and of the object.
itag(o)i+1 := itag(o)i ∪ itag(p)i
xptag(o)i+1 := xptag(p)i ⊓ xptag(o)i
The figures 1 and 2 summarize the propagations of the tags
in the different cases mentionned above.
Execution
Object Process Object
Write
I I I
X X X
xptag xptag
ptag
The part of the policy concerning users is also used in the computation.
itag
I
X
I
X
itag
xptag
itag
ptag ptag
I I
I I
X X
X X
Running
Fig. 1. Diagram with an execution and a write-like operation
ProcessObject
Read
II
XX
xptagxptag
The previous tag of the process is also used in the computation. 
itag itag
ptagptag
II
II
XX
XX
Fig. 2. Diagram with a read-like operation
V. SETTING UP THE INITIAL TAGS
In previous works, the authors have presented how to
automatically derive an information flow policy starting from
a DAC policy [6] or how administrators can compute an ad-
hoc policy[12]. In this section, we will present an algorithm
to derive a Blare policy from a MAC policy.
A. Initialization of tags starting from an existing policy P =
(PPC ,PU ,PΠ)
At initialization time, i.e. the initial state of the system,
before we start to track information flows, persistent containers
are attached an information tag, a policy tag, and an execute
policy tag matching the policy.
1) Initial information tag : a unique meta-information
describing the initial content of the container is stored into
its information tags. This initial information is considered as
being atomic (atomic information are the smallest pieces of
information that we are able to distinguish in the system).
2) Initial policy tag: for any persistent container c, the
associated policy tag is the set of elements in the policy
regarding this container.
∀c ∈ PC, ptag0(c) := PPC(c)
3) Initial execute policy tag: for any persistent container
c, the associated execute policy tag is the set of elements in
the policy regarding the execution of the content of c. We
note Pclass : PC → Π the relation that associates a class of
processes to any persistent container c. Any process executing
the content of c belongs to this class.
xptag0(c) := PΠ(Pclass(c))
If the object does not contain executable code, the correspond-
ing class will not appear in PΠ and the xptag will be empty.
B. Deriving an information flow policy from an AppArmor
Policy
In the following, an information flow policy (centered on
programs) is derived from an AppArmor MAC policy. Such
a policy does not specify rules based on users, and thus (PU )
is empty. As Blare monitors information flows, we do not
take into consideration access control rules that would not be
related to any flow transition. To derive a Blare policy from
a set of AppArmor profiles, the following is performed : for
each statement in the AppArmor policy, we check whether
such a statement is related to a potential information flow,
and transform it into a Blare statement if it does. The ability
to derive such a Blare policy will be useful for future works
in comparing different models in terms of intrusion detection,
as each model would be configured with a common security
policy.
1) AppArmor: In an AppArmor profile, the permission
granted to a program pi over a resource o can be one of the
following : (r,w,l,m,ix,px,Px,ux,Ux).
r read (executing also needs this permission)
w write
a append
l link mode (mediates access to symlinks and hardlinks)
m allow executables mapping (mmap)
ix inherit execute mode (the resource inherits the current
profile, even if a profile already exists for this resource)
px discrete profile execute mode (if no profile is defined for
the resource, execution is denied)
Px scrub the environment (same as px but will use kernel’s
unsafe exec routines : tells glibc to clean the environment
before executing the resource. It helps protect against e.g.
LD PRELOAD abuse)
ux unconstrained execute mode (no profile is needed)
Ux unconstrained/scrub the environment
Fig. 3. AppArmor access modes
AppArmor profiles also constrain access to network re-
sources and POSIX capabilities. However, these are access
control rules and aren’t taken into account in this paper.
Instead, possible information flows related to those accesses
are captured at another level (i.e. actual illegal flow occurs).
Such rules would add false positives and are discarded in our
derivation.
Definition 3: An AppArmor policy P is a set of profiles.
A profile p ∈ P is a set of rules of the form (o, α) where o
is an object and α is a permission. All these rules confine
a given program pi ∈ Π. Such a profile is defined as :
(pi, {(o1, α1), . . . , (on, αn)})
For each AppArmor policy statement, if it allows a potential
flow between a subject and an object, such as defined in
section, we update the Blare tag system accordingly.
2) Algorithm: The following algorithm transforms an Ap-
pArmor policy (a set of profiles) into an expression of a Blare
policy (set of policy labels on containers). Let P be the set of
all the AppArmor profiles in the policy. For any profile p ∈ P ,
p.container is the container associated to the binary program
constrained by p, p.canread() is the list of files on which
a read like access is authorized, p.canexec() is the list of
executable allowed to be executed, and p.canwrite() is the list
of paths where it is allowed to write. TOP represents the set of
all atomic information tags in the system (it corresponds to ⊤),
inherit(p) : bool returns true if the profile p inherits from its
parent’s profile and false otherwise. unconstrained(p) : bool
returns true if the associated program (subject) is uncon-
strained and false if not. Run(I) is defined in section III.
function tag(P)
for each p in P ; do
class = Run(itag(p.container))
if unconstrained(p)
data = TOP
code = TOP
else
for r in p.canread() ; do
data += itag(r)
end
for x in p.canexec() ; do
code += Run(x)
end
end
xptag(p.container) = data + code
for w in p.canwrite() ; do
w.ptag += data + class
end
end
end
VI. EXAMPLE
The following is an example of intrusion detected by this
model, when configured with an information flow policy de-
rived from an AppArmor policy. Here, the security is centered
on programs, with no user dependent policy rules. Consider
the following AppArmor policy example, where two programs
are confined : apache and ftpd. Both own files that the other
is not allowed to read. We consider AppArmor being setup in
permissive mode, and we compare its behavior to our IDS in
terms of detection potential.
{/usr/bin/apache,
{(/etc/apache2.conf, w),
(/etc/apache2.conf, r),
(/www/index.php,r), (/usr/bin/ftpd, px)}
}
{/usr/bin/ftpd,
{(/etc/ftpd.conf,w), (/etc/ftpd.conf,r),
(/home/ftpd/data,w)}
}
Using the previously introduced algorithm, we can derive
a Blare policy and compute its expression on the tag system
(the function Run() is written R() in the following table):
path itag ptag xptag
/usr/bin/apache {i1} {i1} {R(i1), R(i2), i3, i6}
/usr/bin/ftpd {i2} {i2} {R(i2), i4}
/etc/apache2.conf {i3} {R(i1), i3, i6} ⊤
/etc/ftpd.conf {i4} {R(i2), i4} ⊤
/home/ftpd/data {i5} {R(i2), i4, i5} ⊤
/www/index.php {i6} {R(i1), i3, i6} ⊤
Now, the following execution sequence takes place (see
figure 4). The apache process first reads its configura-
tion file /etc/apache2.conf . Then it reads and interprets
/www/index.php, containing a security flaw. Arbitrary code
is injected and executed through apache. It introduces a
malware in the binary code of /usr/bin/ftpd.
In this first part of the execution, the process running apache
is not expected to write into /usr/bin/ftpd : the policy tag
of this container is not allowed to receive information by a
process running apache. Furthermore, the information apache
previously read (and figuring in its information tag) does not
belong to the policy tag of /usr/bin/ftpd. This would trigger
an alert with both AppArmor (configured in permissive mode)
and Blare.
Then, apache runs the modified ftpd. The process running
apache is allowed to execute ftpd in the security policy, hence
AppArmor would allow this execution. But here, the informa-
tion tag of ftpd has been modified when the arbitrary code
was written into it, and meta-information have been added to
it. Those new meta-information do not figure in the policy tag
of the process running apache, thus it is not authorized to run
ftpd anymore, and this would trigger a second alert for illegal
code execution with Blare. This quite simple example reveals
one of the major goals of Blare : the security administrator
can specify a fine-grained information flow policy including
processes behavior. Many real life viruses would trigger alerts
in this model as soon as the code of a process is changed or
confidential information is moved.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a model of intrusion
detection based on an information flow policy, dynamically
checking that it is respected. The policy specifies which
information may be combined together and which information
the containers are allowed to contain. This model offers high
expressiveness since we are able to assign meta-information
to any data in the system and to constrain the behavior of
programs when those data are involved. The policy expresses
restrictions on access to information regardless of where it
is located in the system by using a tag system associating
meta-information to information containers. We explain how
we maintain tags when information flows occur and how we
can check if the policy is respected. A central concept of this
model is the execution of programs. This model performs
dynamic checking at execution time, and is able to detect
executions of illegal code or illegal flows of information.
Today’s MAC implementations in the Linux kernel come
with extensive default security policies. It is possible to set
up a policy for the model we propose out of an existing
MAC policy. We show how to derive a Blare information flow
policy from an AppArmor MAC policy, and give an example
of practical use.
In our future works we will focus on an implementation
of this model in the Linux kernel as a LSM module. We
also aim to further enrich this model on two main aspects.
First, a user owning information will be able to declassify it.
Second, we will provide a high-level language to specify an
information flow policy for Blare.
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